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The literature on commons has established the validity and significance of Elinor
Ostrom’s design principles for collective action. Can these principles be used to
guide policies and initiatives towards adaptive co-management? We analyze this idea
by using two case studies, Piriápolis (Uruguay) and Paraty (Brazil). Both cases are
small-scale fisheries, and both have been experiencing a social-ecological crisis in a
context of prevailing top-down government management. However, there are signs
that government policies are moving towards participatory governance. The objective
of this article is to identify opportunities and barriers to adaptive co-management of
small-scale fisheries in Uruguay and Brazil using Ostrom’s design principles for guidance.
Both case studies partially meet seven of the eleven design principles (as amended by
Cox and colleagues), but do not fulfill four. The analysis of the fisheries using Ostrom’s
principles sheds light on the opportunities and barriers to adaptive co-management in
three categories: resource system, resource users, and governance system. Barriers
include long-standing conflicts between small-scale fishers and government agencies,
and between small and large-scale fisheries sectors. Nevertheless, recent initiatives
involving participatory approaches to research and management show potential to
improve compliance with several principles. Two weaknesses of using Ostrom’s principles
for the analysis of the cases were a lack of attention to social learning and the exclusion
of external drivers.
Keywords: Commons; Comanagement; Governance; Participation; Social learning;
Social-ecological systems; Artisanal fisheries; Migration
Introduction
It is well known in the commons literature that resource users, such as small-scale
fishers, are capable of managing their resources under certain circumstances (e.g.,
Ostrom 1990; Agrawal 2001; Dietz et al. 2002; Cinner et al. 2013; Ernst et al. 2013).
Three kinds of “pure” property rights regimes – common property, private property,
and state (or government) property – have all been associated with both success and
failure, although top-down state property regimes are seldom associated with success-
ful management (Feeny et al. 1990; Ostrom 2005). Over time, commons theory has
sought new questions and approaches. Commons research has increasingly moved to
considering commons as complex systems characterized by self-organization, non-
linearity, uncertainty, and scale (Berkes et al. 2003; Berkes 2009). As well, there has
been a shift in emphasis regarding scale, moving from local to multilevel approaches,
including local, regional and global levels (Ostrom et al. 1999; Dietz et al. 2003).2015 Trimble and Berkes. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided
he original work is properly credited.
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been widely proposed as a partial solution to resource crises and conflicts (e.g., Jentoft
et al. 1998; Gutiérrez et al. 2011). As a management regime that bridges community
and government levels (Wilson et al. 2003), co-management can be understood as a
type of property rights regime, combining elements of common property and state
property, but can also be seen as an institutional design that considers the sharing of
costs and benefits. Co-management was initially conceived as a power-sharing arrange-
ment between the state and a community of resource users (e.g., Pinkerton 1989;
Pomeroy and Berkes 1997). However, it has been evolving over time; the concept has
become more complex, recognizing the existence of multiple stakeholders with
multiple relationships, as documented for example for the Chilean coastal benthic
co-management system (Marín and Berkes 2010). In addition, co-management has
increasingly been understood as a problem solving process, often long and continuous,
rather than an endpoint (Carlsson and Berkes 2005).
Furthermore, co-management needs to incorporate a learning-by-doing component,
becoming adaptive co-management over time (Armitage et al. 2007, 2008). Often seen
as a natural evolution of co-management (Olsson et al. 2004), adaptive co-management
combines the dynamic learning characteristic of adaptive management (experimental
and experiential) with the linking characteristic of co-management, vertically and hori-
zontally (Plummer et al. 2012). Key features of adaptive co-management include a focus
on integrating different knowledge systems, collaboration and power sharing among
community, regional, and national levels, and management flexibility (Olsson et al.
2004). Adaptive co-management becomes particularly suitable for managing complex
social-ecological systems that include human and biophysical subsystems in a two-way
feedback relationship (Berkes 2011). It is also suitable to deal with wicked problems,
such as fisheries and coastal governance (Jentoft and Chuenpagdee 2009), because
these require participatory approaches with interaction, deliberation and social learning
(Schusler et al. 2003) involving community and government stakeholders.
There is a vast literature specifying the conditions that would promote the sus-
tainable management of the commons (e.g., Ostrom 1990; Agrawal 2001), success-
ful co-management (e.g., Pomeroy 2007; Evans et al. 2011; Cinner et al. 2012), and
adaptive co-management (e.g., Armitage et al. 2009). However, most authors would
probably agree that these conditions are situation-specific, because adaptive co-
management itself depends on the context (Armitage et al. 2009). Ostrom’s (1990)
eight design principles are remarkable in the scholarly literature about commons
sustainability and collective action because they capture some of the commonalities re-
garding the necessary conditions. These principles have been used to evaluate and diag-
nose various resource systems, including fisheries (e.g., Pinkerton and Weinstein 1995;
Gelcich et al. 2006; Yandle 2008; Arias Schreiber and Halliday 2013; McClanahan et al.
2013; Fleischman et al. 2014; Galappaththi and Berkes 2015), and some are among the
necessary conditions for co-management and adaptive co-management (e.g., Pomeroy
2007; Armitage et al. 2009). Cox et al. (2010) analyzed 91 of these studies and con-
cluded that Ostrom’s eight principles were well supported empirically, but suggested
splitting three of them, in line with the evidence from the cases.
This research is based on two coastal artisanal or small-scale fisheries, one in
Piriápolis (Río de la Plata, Uruguay) and the other in Praia Grande/Ilha do
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ally, economically and socially in Uruguay and Brazil, as well as in South
America in general (Begossi 2010; Salas et al. 2011). Nevertheless, government
fishery development policies in both countries have focused almost exclusively on
large-scale fisheries (Diegues 2006; Galli 2008; Puig et al. 2010). Small-scale fish-
eries in coastal Uruguay and Brazil have been experiencing a social-ecological
crisis (Trimble 2013), which is alarming because of the numerous coastal com-
munities they sustain. Catches have been declining (according to government’s of-
ficial data and fishers’ observations), fishers are in need of additional sources of
income, and the mismanagement of fisheries has led to a questioning of the top-
down approach (Diegues 2006; Trimble and Johnson 2013; Begossi and Lopes
2014; Zurba and Trimble 2014). However, there are signs of progress. In both
countries, government agencies in charge of fisheries management have shown
willingness to devolve some power to user groups in order to increase compli-
ance of rules through co-management, among other reasons (Seixas et al. 2009;
Trimble 2013). As well, fishers are willing to become meaningfully involved in
fisheries decision-making (Trimble and Johnson 2013).
Considering the positive outcomes of adaptive co-management, such as in-
creased social-ecological resilience, enhanced efficiency and effectiveness of deci-
sion making, and community empowerment (Plummer et al. 2012), the objective
of this research is to identify opportunities and barriers to adaptive co-
management of small-scale fisheries in coastal Uruguay and Brazil using Ostrom’s
design principles for guidance. This is timely because of the ongoing transition
from top-down management to participatory approaches to decision making in
the study areas. In addition, we intend to contribute to the use of Ostrom’s prin-
ciples for diagnostic and prescriptive purposes in contexts where management re-
gimes are being reformed. We do not intend, however, to conduct a pre- and
post-assessment of the fisheries as this transition is in progress. In the next sec-
tion we describe the research design, the study areas and the methods. In the re-
sults section we provide a snapshot analysis of the compliance with Ostrom’s
design principles as modified by Cox et al. (2010), and identify opportunities for
improving the fit with the principles in the two fisheries. In the final section we
discuss opportunities and barriers to adaptive co-management, as suggested by
the analysis of the principles.Methods
Research design and description of the case studies
This research was based on two case studies. The case study in Uruguay took
place in the Piriápolis area, which comprises four landing sites (Pesquero Stella
Maris, Piriápolis Port, Playa Hermosa and Playa Verde). The case study in Brazil
was undertaken in two neighbouring communities in Paraty Municipality, Praia
Grande and Ilha do Araújo (Fig. 1). Piriápolis is partly representative of small-
scale fisheries locations on the Río de la Plata estuary, whereas Paraty is partly
representative of Caiçara fishing communities of Southeastern Brazil. Fieldwork in
Uruguay spanned 17 months (May–August 2010 and March 2011–March 2012),
Fig. 1 Study areas: Piriápolis (Uruguay) and Praia Grande and Ilha do Araújo (Paraty, Brazil)
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Fieldwork was longer in Uruguay because the research involved the facilitation of
a participatory research project involving multiple fisheries stakeholders, investi-
gating the role of this process in creating conditions for adaptive co-management
(Trimble 2013; Trimble and Berkes 2013).
Piriápolis is a seaside city located in the external zone of the Río de la Plata
(La Plata River), 98 km east of Montevideo, the capital city of Uruguay. About
10,000 people live in Piriápolis throughout the year, but this number increases
through tourism to 40,000 during the austral summer. The number of artisanal
or small-scale fishers and boats varies greatly throughout the year (e.g., from 30
to 150 fishers) and from year to year, mainly owing to resource availability. Many
fishers are seasonally migratory: they move along the coast (either sailing or car-
rying their boats on a truck) primarily in response to whitemouth croaker (Micro-
pogonias furnieri) movements. During the fieldwork period, the estimated number
of fishing boats operating in each landing site varied as follows: 3–10 in Pesquero
Stella Maris, 20–35 in Piriápolis port, 3–12 in Playa Hermosa, and 2–3 in Playa
Verde. The majority of the fishing boats have a crew of three. The fishing gear
most commonly used consists of bottom-set long-lines and gillnets of different
mesh sizes. The three main species caught are the whitemouth croaker, the Bra-
zilian codling (Urophycis brasiliensis), and the stripped weakfish (Cynoscion gua-
tupuca). Most fishers sell their catch, entirely or partly, to fish buyers. Almost all
of the Brazilian codling go to domestic markets, whereas the majority of the
croaker and weakfish are exported (for details about catches and exports see
DINARA 2014). Women generally do shore work related to fishing, such as pre-
paring the long-lines and baiting the hooks, disentangling the fish from gillnets
when the boats arrive at the port, and cleaning fish.
In Praia Grande and Ilha do Araújo, as in other communities of Paraty munici-
pality (Rio de Janeiro State), small-scale fisheries are important for the local
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known tourist destination. It is located inside the Atlantic Forest region, between
two of the largest urban centres in Brazil: Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. Artisanal
or small-scale fisheries have provided a source of both food and income for the
Caiçaras, the local people who are descendants of Portuguese colonizers, native in-
digenous peoples, and African slaves (Diegues 2006). Caiçara livelihoods are com-
posed of a mix of activities including fisheries, agriculture, and increasingly,
tourism and the sale of non-timber forest products (Hanazaki et al. 2007, 2013).
Fishers generally combine fishing with tourism, taking tourists aboard their boats,
although fishing is the activity they prefer. They wish catches were not declining
so that they could keep fishing in the future (Trimble and Johnson 2013).
The fishing tradition remains stronger in Ilha do Araújo, with an estimated
number of 50 fishers from the 116 households of the village, compared to 25 in
Praia Grande from 140 households. In both communities, fishers are generally
canoe and/or boat owners and they mostly work on their own (i.e., one fisher per
canoe or boat). Although canoes have been largely replaced by motorized boats,
some fishers, especially the older ones, still use dugout canoes to go fishing. Fish-
ing gear consists mostly of trawl nets and otter trawls for shrimp, gillnets of dif-
ferent mesh sizes for fish and shrimp, and to a lesser degree, bottom-set long-
lines. The main species caught are shrimp (Xiphopenaeus kroyeri, Litopenaeus
schmitti), whitemouth croaker, weakfish (Cynoscion spp.) and common snook
(Centropomus undecimalis). As in Piriápolis, most fishers sell their catch, entirely
or partly, to fish buyers. However, the species caught are for domestic markets,
not exports. Women generally work on shore, peeling shrimp, catching crabs,
and gutting and filleting fish. Men and women working in the Piriápolis and
Paraty fisheries tend to like their jobs, which they see as a way of life (Trimble
and Johnson 2013). About 80 % of the terrestrial area of the Paraty Municipality
and adjacent marine areas are occupied by protected areas. Tamoios Ecological
Station (ESEC Tamoios) is a no-take protected area which was established by a
government decree in 1990 with the aim of protection, research and monitoring
the marine ecosystem of the Ilha Grande Bay, and its islands. The use of marine
resources in the ESEC Tamoios is forbidden, resulting in conflicts between fishers
and the agency in charge, the Chico Mendes Institute for Conservation of Bio-
diversity (ICMBio 2009). Fishers from Praia Grande and Ilha do Araújo fish in-
side and around the ESEC Tamoios.
According to Paraty and Piriápolis fishers, the trend of declining catches has
become more noticeable since 1990–2000 and 2000–2005, respectively. Moreover,
they stated that certain species have disappeared from the catch in both regions,
leading to decreased catch diversity (Trimble 2013). In Uruguay and Brazil, fish-
eries are legally the property of the State. DINARA (The National Directorate of
Aquatic Resources) within the Ministry of Livestock, Agriculture and Fisheries
(MGAP) is the government agency in charge of management in Uruguay. How-
ever, several other agencies have responsibility over fishery-related issues. In
Brazil, fisheries are managed by two government organizations: the Ministry of
Fisheries and Aquaculture (MPA); and the Brazilian Institute of Environment and
Renewable Natural Resources (IBAMA, within the Ministry of Environment). The
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fisheries resources, whereas IBAMA is in charge of enforcement and management
or protection of threatened species (Medeiros 2009). ICMBio is the agency in
charge of federal protected areas in Brazil.
Data collection
A total of 64 respondents (55 men and 9 women) were interviewed, formally or in-
formally, in Uruguay: 42 small-scale fishers (Piriápolis); 8 members of DINARA; 2
members of the Coast Guard; 1 member of the Port Authority; 1 member of the
Municipal Government; 1 member of the national union of seamen (SUNTMA,
representing mainly the large-scale fisheries sector); 2 fish buyers; 5 university re-
searchers; and 2 members of NGOs. Meanwhile, in Brazil, formal and informal
interviews were conducted with 32 respondents (22 men and 10 women): 30 small-
scale fishers (15 from Praia Grande and 15 from Ilha do Araújo); 1 fish buyer; and
the president of the fishers’ municipal union (Colônia de Pescadores de Paraty). In
both cases, fishers were selected purposively to maximize respondent diversity in
terms of age, years of experience in the fishery, and gear used.
The main topics addressed in the interviews were as follows: (i) social-
ecological changes that have been occurring in the fishery (e.g., Have there been
changes in the species diversity, abundance, size? Have the fishing practices and
fishing spots changed?); (ii) local and formal rules for resource use (e.g., How do
you decide when to go fishing for what? Are there local norms and/or regula-
tions? Who enforces and what are the sanctions when rules are violated?); (iii)
social relationships among fishers (including social norms), between fishers and
government agencies, and between government agencies (e.g., How is your rela-
tionship with [name of the stakeholder] in terms of trust, respect, solidarity, fre-
quency and purpose of communication? Have those relationships changed over
time?); and (iv) fisher participation in management (e.g., How are new regulations
made? Should fishers participate in decision-making? Should local and scientific
knowledge be combined or complemented?). Interviews were conducted in Span-
ish (Uruguay) and Portuguese (Brazil) by the lead author. Some interviews were
audio-recorded and some were recorded by handwritten notes. Interviews and
field notes were coded in their original language.
In the two study areas, participant observation was a complementary data col-
lection procedure throughout the research. The researcher lived in the communi-
ties and participated in fishers’ daily activities on land and at sea, taking
descriptive and analytical field notes daily (Bernard 2006). Participant observation
was also conducted during the following events: two informal meetings held at
landing sites in Piriápolis, one formal meeting with fishers organized by the lead
author at a municipal venue, and multistakeholder participatory research work-
shops in the same city; sessions of one council in Canelones (Río de la Plata
coast) established by the government for artisanal fisheries co-management; one
meeting of the community association of Praia Grande; and the first meeting or-
ganized by ICMBio to discuss an institutional arrangement called Commitment
Terms in the ESEC Tamoios. Finally, document review was conducted to comple-
ment and validate data gathered through observational and conversational
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ports, and new fisheries law in Uruguay.
Ostrom’s design principles (as amended by Cox et al. 2010) did not guide the
data collection process but were used as an analytic tool for the purpose of this
paper. Table 1 shows the sources of data used to analyze each principle. Our ob-
jective was not to conduct an exhaustive analysis of the compliance with the de-
sign principles in the two small-scale fisheries but rather to discuss how the
principles may shed light on the identification of opportunities and barriers to
adaptive co-management (i.e., the main theoretical framework guiding the broader
research).Table 1 Ostrom’s design principles (as amended by Cox et al. 2010) and sources of data to
qualitatively analyze their compliance in the two case studies
Design principles (Ostrom 1990,
Cox et al. 2010)
Definition (Cox et al. 2010) Sources of
data
1A. Clearly defined user boundaries Clear boundaries between legitimate users





1B. Clearly defined resource boundaries Clear boundaries are present that define a




2A. Congruence between rules and
local conditions
Appropriation and provision rules are congruent





2B. Proportional equivalence between
costs (provision rules) and benefits
(appropriation rules)
The benefits obtained by users from a common-pool
resource (CPR), as determined by appropriation rules,
are proportional to the amount of inputs required
in the form of labor, material, or money, as
determined by provision rules
Participant
observation
3. Collective-choice arrangements Most individuals affected by the operational rules
can participate in modifying the operational rules
Participant
observation
4A. Monitoring rule enforcement Monitors who are accountable to the users monitor




4B. Monitoring the resources Monitors who are accountable to the users monitor
the condition of the resource
Participant
observation
5. Graduated sanctions Appropriators who violate operational rules are likely
to be assessed graduated sanctions (depending on
the seriousness and the context of the offense) by
other appropriators, by officials accountable to the




6. Conflict-resolution mechanisms Appropriators and their officials have rapid access to
low-cost local arenas to resolve conflicts among




7. Minimal recognition of rights
to organize
The rights of appropriators to devise their own




8. Nested enterprises Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement,
conflict resolution, and governance activities are





Trimble and Berkes Maritime Studies  (2015) 14:14 Page 8 of 20Results: analyzing the fisheries with the aid of Ostrom’s design principles
In this section, we analyze whether the fisheries in Piriápolis and Paraty comply with
Ostrom’s design principles, indicating if conditions for collective action are met
(Table 2). First, we look at the principles which are not achieved, and second, we focus
on those which are partially achieved. Given the many similarities between the two
cases, findings are presented jointly and not in separate sections. Attention is given to
the changes that the fisheries have experienced as social-ecological systems. Finally, we
analyze opportunities for increasing compliance with the design principles.Unfulfilled principles in the Piriápolis and Paraty fisheries
Principle 1B states that a resource system should have well-defined boundaries, separat-
ing it from the larger biophysical environment. These boundaries help internalize the
positive and negative externalities originating from resource use (Ostrom 1990; Cox
et al. 2010). The main fishing resources in the two study areas are broadly distributed
and hence the conditions do not comply with Principle 1B. For instance, the white-
mouth croaker is widely distributed along the western coast of the Atlantic Ocean, from
Mexico to Argentina. The species distribution is continuous from Southeastern Brazil to
Argentina, and the Río de la Plata estuary is an important spawning area (Vasconcellos
and Haimovici 2006). Although Principle 1B applies to fishing resources (e.g., Gelcich
et al. 2006; Ernst et al. 2013), in many cases, unclear boundaries of mobile fishing re-
sources are the rule rather than the exception (e.g., Pinkerton and Weinstein 1995;
Fleischman et al. 2014).
According to Principle 2B, the benefits obtained by users from a commons, via their partici-
pation in collective action, as determined by appropriation rules, should be proportional to
inputs in the form of labour, material, or money, as determined by provision rules (Ostrom
1990; Cox et al. 2010). In both study areas, given the prevailing lack of restrictions on fishing
effort (e.g., gillnet and long-line length), boat owners with higher financial capital are free to
increase their fishing effort and make more profit. Fishers who own smaller boats and/or those
who operate with less fishing gear are critical of the larger operators and are concerned about
overfishing. In fact, many fishers in coastal Uruguay are concerned that the small-scale fisheryTable 2 Fulfillment of Ostrom’s design principles in the Piriápolis (Uruguay) and Paraty (Brazil)
small-scale fisheries
Design principles (Ostrom 1990, Cox et al. 2010) Piriápolis Paraty
1A. Clearly defined user boundaries Partially Partially
1B. Clearly defined resource boundaries No No
2A. Congruence between rules and local conditions Partially Partially
2B. Proportional equivalence between costs (provision rules)
and benefits (appropriation rules)
No No
3. Collective-choice arrangements Partially Partially
4A. Monitoring rule enforcement Partially Partially
4B. Monitoring the resources Partially Partially
5. Graduated sanctions Partially Partially
6. Conflict-resolution mechanisms No No
7. Minimal recognition of rights to organize Partially Partially
8. Nested enterprises No No
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catches in the two cases is not a consequence of collective action but rather of the lack of clear
appropriation and provision rules regarding fishing effort, thus violating Principle 2B.
Conflicts over the commons are inevitable, and thus low-cost conflict-resolution
mechanisms (Principle 6), both among resource users and between users and officials,
are important for collective action (Cox et al. 2010). In Piriápolis and Paraty, there are
numerous conflicts between fishers and government agencies, as well as within and be-
tween user groups, between small- and large-scale fishers, between small-scale fishers using
different gear, and between small-scale and sport fishers. In addition, government agencies
involved in fisheries management lack coordination in the two study areas (Trimble 2013).
However, there are no arenas for addressing and resolving these conflicts.
Nested enterprises (Principle 8) are also lacking. This principle establishes that appro-
priation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and governance activ-
ities are organized in a hierarchy of levels. Given the multiple scales of fishing
resources in Piriápolis and Paraty, nesting the smaller systems in the larger ones may
be necessary as institutional nesting can help accomplish the match between the user
and the resource boundaries (Cox et al. 2010; Fleischman et al. 2014).
Principles partially satisfied in Piriápolis and Paraty
User boundaries
Clear boundaries between legitimate users and nonusers are important for collective
action (Principle 1A), and this is inevitably related to resource boundaries (Ostrom
1990; Cox et al. 2010). Both in Uruguay and Brazil, the large-scale fishery exploits many
of the same species (e.g. croaker) as the small-scale fishery. In Uruguay, fishers and
non-fisher stakeholders claimed that coastal bottom-pair-trawling, the main fishing
technique used by the large-scale sector, was the major cause of resource decline. In
Paraty, fishers stated that the main causes of resource decline were bottom-trawling by
both small and large-scale fishers, encircling gillnet for snook by small-scale fishers,
and purse-seining by large-scale boats called traineiras.
“Legitimate users” are those who have a valid fishing license issued by DINARA
(Uruguay) or the Ministry of Fisheries and Aquaculture (Brazil). In Brazil, small-scale fish-
ing licenses do not determine boundaries for fishing activities, except that boats cannot
operate inside no-take protected areas (e.g., ESEC Tamoios). Fishers in the Municipality
of Paraty usually fish close to their community, and there is some informal division of
fishing locations, although there is shared use of many other locations by fishers from
different communities, such as Praia Grande and Tarituba (Begossi et al. 2012).
In Uruguay, DINARA passed a regulation in 2002 establishing the boundaries of four
marine-coastal Artisanal Fishing Zones in the Río de la Plata and Atlantic Ocean, and
in 2004 established three additional “overlap zones” (Fig. 2). One of the goals of this
regulation was to facilitate fisher mobility within their zone. Prior to this regulation,
fishers had to obtain DINARA authorization every time they wanted to depart from a
landing site different from the one at which they were licensed. As Fig. 2 shows, each
zone contains many fish landing sites; Piriápolis is located in Zone E. Fishers migrate
within and sometimes between zones. Fishers may have authorization in the adjacent
“overlap zone” of their assigned zone. Some also cross zone boundaries taking advan-
tage of weak enforcement of fishing regulations. Most Piriápolis fishers, similar to
Fig. 2 Small-scale fishing zones in coastal Uruguay (as determined by DINARA) showing seasonal movements
of fish and fishers (as relevant to Principles 1A and 1B). The dots along the coast show the location of fishing
communities and/or landing sites of small-scale fishers. The solid lines show fishing zones D, E and L (zone K -
comprising coastal lagoons - is not shown). The dashed lines show the overlap zones CD, DE and EL. The thick
line with arrow denotes croaker movements (June–September), and the thin line with arrow indicates fisher
movements in parallel with croaker migrations. The offshore boundaries of the zones are not necessarily to scale
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fish migrate and the fishers could not make a living if they could not follow the fish.
These fishers argue that “Uruguay is for Uruguayans”, meaning they should be allowed
to fish along the entire coastline. Nonetheless, the majority of the fishers consider that
poorly organized mobility of fishing boats can be chaotic creating a concentration of
too many boats in a small area.
Numerous changes have been occurring in the two fisheries, affecting compliance
with this principle. Due to catch decline and the uncertainties associated with the in-
creased unpredictability of the fishing activity, fishers have increasingly needed to look
for alternative or additional sources of income. In the case of Piriápolis, this trend is
particularly strong for fishers who decide not to migrate seasonally. At both sites, fish-
ers have been noticing changes related to climate, such as increased unpredictability of
weather conditions, unclear definition of the four seasons, and shifting wind patterns.
These environmental changes have affected the occurrence of certain fish species (e.g.,
croaker, snook), making it more difficult to predict the beginning of fishing seasons
(zafras: periods in which a certain species is caught in abundance). For instance, the
croaker season in Piriápolis used to last three months in winter, whereas now it lasts
less than a month. This has led fishers to move seasonally from Piriápolis to other lo-
calities where the croaker season is still on. Fishers’ movements along the coast of
Uruguay have changed over time. They are not as predictable as in the early 2000s,
when the usual pattern was that fishers moved from Montevideo to Canelones during
the fall and winter, and during the spring and early summer they concentrated in the
area near Montevideo where the croaker spawns. Piriápolis fishers were not migrating
in 1995 but now many are. Since 2006, they have increasingly migrated seasonally to
the west, following the croaker. In Paraty, fishers do not migrate to other localities
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fishing with tourism activities, in contrast with the winter when fishing is conducted
full-time.
Local rules and social norms: congruence, collective choice, and rights
This section addresses three other principles (2A, 3 and 7) that are partially satisfied.
The congruence between appropriation/provision rules and social-environmental con-
ditions (Principle 2A) contributes to sustainable resource use and collective action. In
Piriápolis and Paraty, there was some congruence between local rules and conditions.
In both areas there was a local rule of first comer’s rights. Once fishers set their gill-
nets, other fishers are expected to give them enough space so as not to cut off their fish
supply. The actual distance between gillnets may vary according to season and to avail-
ability of fish. During the croaker season in Piriápolis and the snook season in Paraty,
when resources are abundant, the distance between gillnets is relatively short. Also re-
lated to congruence, non-fishing days (such as Virgin’s day -Yemanjá, Good Friday, and
All Souls Day) were usually respected in both study areas, especially by Catholic fishers,
but not by Evangelicals in Paraty. However, if fishers were going through hard times
(i.e., poor catch) they could go fishing on those days without sanction. Furthermore,
when selling opportunities were scarce, in one of the landing sites in Piriápolis, fishers
would sometimes take turns going fishing and/or doubling the crew to six fishers in-
stead of three, so that they could spread the benefits and all make some money.
Non-congruence between formal rules imposed by the government and local social-
environmental conditions seemed to be common in both areas. In Uruguay, for example, a
no-take zone for gillnets and long-lines within 300 m off the shoreline was created by
DINARA, supposedly to protect spawning and nursery areas. The zone also functions to
prevent conflicts between small-scale fishing and “nautical activities” such as recreational
fishing. After coastal small-scale fishers mobilized to protest that this regulation affected
their livelihoods, the no-take zone became effective only through the summer, which is high
tourist season. In Paraty, the shrimp closed-season (March to May) is an example of
internal-external incongruence. Fishers stated that the closed season should be earlier in the
year because otherwise it leads to the harvest of undersized shrimp (see Trimble et al.
2014). These are examples of negative consequences on fishers and resources when exter-
nally imposed rules do not match local practices and environmental conditions.
The collective-choice principle (3) proposes that individuals affected by the oper-
ational rules should be able to participate in making and modifying those rules. In
Piriápolis and Paraty, there were some local rules, as well as trust, solidarity and reci-
procity norms among fishers, such as helping others in need at sea, sharing fish, and
exchanging information (Trimble 2013). However, there were no collective-choice ar-
rangements to limit fishing effort. This can be explained partly in terms of fishers’
powerlessness in a context in which the large-scale fishery harvests much the same re-
sources, with considerably higher catches. The lack of collective-choice arrangements
to limit effort is also associated with weak organizational capacity among fishers, a con-
sequence of lack of unity according to fishers from both areas. In Piriápolis, there was
no fisher organization; in Paraty, even though there were community organizations
(“residents’ and fishers’ associations”), fishery issues were seldom addressed in meetings
and fishers rarely attended them.
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Fishers from both areas stated that competition among them has increased, and social
norms are now less respected, partly as a consequence of resource decline. For in-
stance, stealing fish and fishing gear, and lying about fishing spots, are now more com-
mon in both Piriápolis and Paraty. At the latter site, fishers also commented that fish
exchange is less frequent than in the past, although it still occurs. Nonetheless, re-
sources decline was not the only factor leading to weakened relationships among fish-
ers. Fishers’ migration to Piriápolis from other localities was another major reason
given by fishers to explain weakened social codes and principles in the fishery, whereas
in Paraty, fishers referred to the negative impacts of increased tourism on social
relationships within their communities after the construction of the coastal highway
BR-101 linking the area to big cities (see also Oliveira and Berkes 2014).
Fishers from both Piriápolis and Paraty recognized that more unity among them is
needed to improve the fishery. Nevertheless, they identified a number of barriers to get-
ting together and working collectively, partially related to: (i) competition for bigger
catches; (ii) differing interests between fishers who make their living exclusively from
the fishery and those with additional sources of income; (iii) differing interests between
fishers with low or high investment in boats and fishing gear; and (iv) fishers’ relation-
ship with fish buyers. Some fishers would like to form an association or cooperative to
sell their catch directly to consumers, whereas others do not want to take any action
that could be seen as opposing fish buyers. Fishers’ dependence on fish buyers, who
provide fuel, ice, bait, and money advances, could thus be considered an example of an
external factor influencing the emergence of collective action.
Principle 7 relates to others discussed in this section, positing that government agen-
cies respect the right of local users to create their own institutions. This principle is
partially fulfilled in both study areas, but not fully because externally imposed rules are
incongruent with local conditions (Principle 2A). In other words, fishers have the right
to define their local rules as long as they obey the formal rules determined by the gov-
ernment, which leads to conflict-laden relationships between fishers and government.
Monitoring and sanctions
Monitoring compliance of rules and the condition of resources (Principles 4A and 4B),
as well as assessing graduated sanctions when rules are violated (Principle 5), are three
other principles leading to collective action. In Piriápolis and Paraty, fishers conduct in-
formal monitoring of resources, but their long-term observations about the resources
rarely reach the government agencies in charge of monitoring and decision making, a
consequence of the prevailing top-down approach. Fishers from the two areas also
monitor compliance, but when it comes to formal rules (e.g., fishing licenses, closed
seasons), they expect the government to enforce and take action; rule enforcement is
meant to be a government task. Fishers do not report law breaking by other small-scale
fishers, they would only report large-scale fishing boats. Moreover, in the Piriápolis
case, one local norm is that fishers must inform others if the Coast Guard or DINARA
is carrying out enforcement in the area. Sanctions imposed by the government in the
two areas (e.g., by DINARA, IBAMA, Coast Guard) include fines and fishing suspen-
sions. Nevertheless, fishers may successfully negotiate with the officers to have the fines
waived without resorting to bribery.
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neither graduated nor collectively established. Sanctions vary according to the rule and
according to the person involved (i.e., different fishers might decide to take different ac-
tions, if any). Sanctions include scolding, decreased information exchange about fishing
spots, and decreased fish exchange, among others. In Piriápolis, for example, after one
crew member robbed a box of fish, nobody would take him fishing for many weeks, an-
other form of punishment. Even though there are local sanctions, fishers wished there
were government sanctions, such as fines, when stealing occurs.
Opportunities for improving compliance with Ostrom’s design principles
Except for resource boundaries (Principle 1B), which logically cannot be changed,
the fulfillment of the remaining principles can potentially be improved. Here we
argue using three lines of evidence that this could be done through participatory
approaches. First, a multi-stakeholder participatory research initiative developed
in Piriápolis since 2011 to address local problems within the fishery sector provided op-
portunities for improving compliance with some of the principles. Fifteen participants
from four stakeholder groups (seven fishers, one artisanal fisheries manager from
DINARA, five university researchers, and two NGO representatives) were committed to
this participatory research process and formed the group called POPA - Por la Pesca Arte-
sanal en Piriápolis. The analysis of the contributions of this initiative to future co-
management in the area (Trimble and Berkes 2013), as well as the evaluation of the par-
ticipatory research process and outcomes (Trimble and Lázaro 2014), suggest that POPA
provided an arena for conflict resolution between fishers and DINARA (Principle 6). It
also contributed to improved collective-choice arrangements by increasing fishers’ unity
(Principle 3).
Second, the new fisheries law in Uruguay (N°19.175, passed in December 2013),
which includes articles about stakeholder participation, provides a “window of op-
portunity” (Gelcich et al. 2010) for alternative management approaches. A national
advisory board, the Fisheries Consultative Council, will be formed by representa-
tives of DINARA, additional ministries (Defense; Foreign Affairs; Ministry of
Housing, Planning and Environment), owners of industrial fishing boats, artisanal
fishers, companies dedicated to the transformation of fish products, and the fish-
eries labour sector. Regional and local advisory boards for consultative co-
management of artisanal fisheries (named “Fisheries Zonal Councils” in the law)
have been established in some areas since 2012. They are integrated by represen-
tatives of DINARA, local and departmental governments, Coast Guard, and arti-
sanal fishers. Both types of boards can potentially function to resolve conflicts
(Principle 6). They can also contribute to building nested enterprises if horizontal
and vertical linkages influencing governance decisions are established (Principle
8). In particular, the national board could provide the opportunity for addressing
conflicts between the small- and the large-scale fishing sectors (Principle 1A). Fur-
thermore, the implementation of zonal or local boards, which requires that fishers
elect legitimate representatives, could contribute to collective-choice arrangements
if fishers’ organizational capacity is improved (Principle 3), perhaps by the help of
external stakeholders (e.g., government, university, NGOs). Nonetheless, the differ-
ent boards created by the new legislation will face numerous challenges due to
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ticipated low degree of power sharing (Trimble 2013), among others.
Third, government agencies responsible for fisheries and environmental manage-
ment in Brazil have included participatory guidelines and frameworks in legislation.
Promising approaches include Fishing Agreements, and deliberative management
councils of two types of sustainable-use protected areas: Extractive Reserves and
Sustainable Development Reserves (Seixas et al. 2009). In our study region in
Brazil, an opportunity for fisher participation in management emerged in 2012,
when the Consultative Council of the ESEC Tamoios started a process towards
building the Commitment Terms (Termos de Compromisso) between the protected
area and fishers from Tarituba (Paraty Municipality) (Trimble et al. 2014). Commit-
ment Terms are an institutional mechanism which was formalized by legislation in
2012, to deal with issues of access and use of natural resources by local/traditional
communities inside no-take protected areas. The Commitment Terms can poten-
tially contribute to: reducing conflicts between fishers and ICMBio (Principle 6);
increasing congruence between local and formal rules (Principle 2A); and favouring
the emergence of collective-choice arrangements among fishers (Principle 3). None-
theless, there are risks that the Commitment Terms might lead to conflicts between
the fishers who will gain access to fish inside the ESEC Tamoios and those who will
have to remain outside (Principle 1A). Furthermore, it has been claimed that Commit-
ment Terms do not ensure fisher autonomy in decision making (Araujo et al. 2014),
which may weaken Principle 6. Also, Commitment Terms are largely influenced by
both the institutional context of the protected areas and the negotiation with the
managers at the time (Araujo et al. 2014).Discussion and conclusions
Ostrom’s design principles are about collective action and how users can manage
common-pool resources (Ostrom 1990). Can they also be used to guide policies to-
wards adaptive co- management? Our analysis using two examples from Uruguay and
Brazil indicates that the design principles help assess cases and provide guidance in the
transition from top-down management to adaptive co-management, although with
some limitations, as discussed below. Table 3 summarizes the major opportunities and
barriers to adaptive co-management of small-scale fisheries in coastal Uruguay and
Brazil. Some of the headings of Ostrom’s (2009) multilevel, nested framework for ana-
lyzing outcomes achieved in social-ecological systems were used for illustrative pur-
poses to organize the presentation of our findings. In what follows we discuss the main
challenges for the transition towards adaptive co-management and we then discuss the
connections between Ostrom’s design principles and the analysis of opportunities and
barriers to adaptive co-management.Challenges for the transition towards adaptive co-management
Many of the barriers to adaptive co-management of small-scale fisheries in Piriápolis-
Uruguay and Paraty-Brazil (Table 3) are complex and concern resource users and the
governance system, indicating the need for institutional arrangements involving stake-
holders at multiple levels (as shown in Section 4.3). Given that adaptive co-
Table 3 Opportunities and barriers to small-scale fisheries adaptive co-management in Piriápolis-
Uruguay (UR) and Paraty-Brazil (BR)
Opportunities Barriers
Resource system (Principles 1B, 4B)
- (UR/BR) Resource crisis may lead to
management changes
- (UR/BR) Catch declines
- (UR/BR) Unclear resource boundaries
Resource users (Principles 1A, 2B, 3)
- (UR/BR) Social norms - (UR) Fishers’ seasonal migration
- (BR) Clear group boundaries - (UR/BR) Weak organizational capacities; limited
collective-choice arrangements
- (UR) Fishers’ capacity to act collectively
when facing crises
- (UR/BR) Weakened relationships among fishers
- (UR/BR) Conflicts with large-scale fisheries
Governance system (Principles 2A, 4A, 5, 6, 7, 8)
- (UR/BR) Fishers’ interest in co-management - (UR/BR) Prevailing top-down management
- (UR) New fisheries law supporting the creation
of multi-stakeholder boards or councils
- (UR/BR) Conflicts between fishers and
management agencies
- (UR) Potential of participatory research
involving multiple stakeholders
- (UR/BR) Weak coordination among government
agencies
- (BR) Growing initiatives for fisher participation
in protected area management
- (UR/BR) Weak government rule enforcement
- (UR/BR) Poor capacity of stakeholders regarding
co-management
Ostrom’s design principles related to each of the three categories (resource system, resource users and governance
system) are shown in parenthesis
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that the higher the uncertainty of the resource system, the greater the need for partici-
patory approaches to research and management.
In some situations, a barrier (catch declines) can also act as an opportunity (a resource
crisis triggering policy change), as seen for example in the reorganization of Chilean
coastal fisheries (Gelcich et al. 2010). Although not shown as an opportunity in Table 3,
conflicts among stakeholder groups are a triggering factor for co-management (e.g.,
Pomeroy and Berkes 1997; Plummer and FitzGibbon 2004), but also a challenge for the
process (e.g., Napier et al. 2005; Pomeroy 2007; Armitage et al. 2009). In fact, conflicts of
interests among those involved, power asymmetries, and insufficient resources (financial,
human, technical, etc.) are among the main factors contributing to the failure of adaptive
co-management, as shown in a recent literature review (Plummer et al. 2012). One major
barrier emerging from our research which did not arise in that review and has received
little attention in the literature is fishers’ migration (Nunan et al. 2012).
Fishers’ seasonal migration is a major issue in the Uruguay case. Clearly defined
boundaries is one of the principles for collective action (Ostrom 1990), and a condition
for adaptive co-management (Armitage et al. 2009). However, in many cases fishers are
mobile. Seasonal migration among fishers, which is common in numerous countries
(e.g., Aburto et al. 2009; Njock and Westlund 2010; Crona and Rosendo 2011), has
implications for co-management. For example, Crona and Rosendo (2011) argued that
migration can either motivate local co-management participation as a means of exclud-
ing outsiders, or it can undermine co-management because of the increased
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related to fishers’ migration requires the collaboration of the different stakeholders in-
volved. This could be done through the adaptive co-management process. In the
Uruguay example, fishers stated that the mobility of fishing boats should be better or-
ganized. Migrant fishers should be thus included in decision-making processes as a dis-
tinct user-group. However, given that migrants may be competing for resources with
host communities, they sometimes suffer from discrimination, marginalization and ex-
clusion from various aspects of community life, including political institutions and
decision-making (Njock and Westlund 2010; Crona and Rosendo 2011; Nunan et al.
2012).
Linking Ostrom’s design principles and adaptive co-management: gaps and opportunities
The assessment of Ostrom’s design principles in our two cases assisted in the identification
of barriers to adaptive comanagement of small-scale fisheries, and also opportunities for
moving in that direction. In fact, there is some congruence between the design principles
and the factors contributing to the success of adaptive co-management as per the recent
literature (Plummer et al. 2012). For example, government control over illegal resource
use, one of these factors, relates to Principle 4A (Monitoring rule enforcement),
whereas social networks and participation of all relevant stakeholders in management,
two other factors contributing to success of adaptive co-management (Plummer et al.
2012) fit within Principle 8 (Nested enterprises).
Nonetheless, social learning, a main component of adaptive co-management, and a factor
contributing to success (Plummer et al. 2012), was not visible when assessing Ostrom’s prin-
ciples. Incorporating learning as an attribute of Ostrom’s social-ecological system framework
has been difficult (Basurto et al. 2013). Adaptive co-management needs feedback learning or
social learning over time; this remains as a challenge for Ostrom’s diagnostic approach.
Furthermore, scale issues were another challenge of using Ostrom’s design principles
towards adaptive co-management. The temporal dimension of scale requires an
accounting for the fact that social-ecological systems are changing fast, as seen in our
two cases. A single analysis of the principles would only give a snapshot. Therefore,
principles should be analyzed over time, and the principles should be made or treated
as dynamic, in the manner of Gelcich et al. (2006); Yandle (2008) and Arias Schreiber
and Halliday (2013), who analyzed the principles at two time periods. In our case studies,
we attempted to do this by analyzing trends in social-ecological change when assessing
the principles, and by illustrating the importance of changes by pointing out that the
formation of the POPA group and its participatory research initiative (Trimble and Berkes
2013) made a difference in meeting at least two design principles.
Our analysis of the two cases suggests that compliance with all of the principles, except
Principle 1B relating to resource boundaries, can potentially be improved through policy
interventions. In particular, adaptive co-management becomes an attractive approach to
overcome challenges in the long run, increasing compliance with the principles, because
there is evidence that this governance approach leads to improved access to resources, in-
creased equity in distribution of costs and benefits, resolution of conflicts, enhanced com-
munication and negotiation, development of networks, and enhanced efficiency and
effectiveness of management (Plummer et al. 2012). However, adaptive co-management, by
itself, is no guarantee of sustainable resource use, social-ecological resilience or pluralism
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policy weakened traditional institutions for certain resources, reducing compliance with
some of the principles (Gelcich et al. 2006). Future research may investigate how co-
management initiatives led by the government in Uruguay and Brazil shift to adaptive co-
management over time, what adaptive co-management outcomes are produced and how
(Plummer et al. 2012, 2014), and how compliance with Ostrom’s principles is improved.
Similarly, the design principles could be applied to the multi-stakeholder boards imple-
mented in Uruguay given that it has been argued that the principles can be adopted as a
practical guide for improving the efficacy of different kinds of groups (e.g., governments,
businesses, neighborhoods) (Wilson et al. 2013).
The scale issue also comes up when considering the impact of large-scale fisheries on
small-scale fisheries. In both study areas, the two kinds of fisheries essentially target the
same mix of species, and the adverse impact of large-scale fisheries is documented (Defeo
et al. 2009; Begossi et al. 2010). To the extent that external impacts and drivers can be con-
sidered a kind of scale issue, competing uses of the coastal zone also fall into this category.
For example, the zoning for recreation and leisure impacts the Piriápolis fishery as discussed
above, and zoning for protected areas impacts the Paraty fishery (Begossi et al. 2010). On
the other hand, Paraty fishers make a major part of their livelihood from tourism (Hanazaki
et al. 2013), so these impacts are not always negative.
As noted by Cox et al. (2010), Ostrom’s principles do not directly take into account
external factors; the principles are essentially about internal factors leading to success-
ful collective action. Hence, the principles need to be supplemented by an analysis of
external drivers such as imports of cheap fish and croaker exports in the case of Piriápolis.
Climate change impacts and government policies favouring large-scale fisheries over
small-scale ones may also fall in this category. In general, global environmental change,
globalized markets and technological changes all have major impacts on commons man-
agement (Berkes 2009; Berkes 2011). Therefore, a complex adaptive systems view would
imply that commons and adaptive co-management research should give more attention
to external variables and drivers (Cox et al. 2010). Individuals or companies using the
same resources as local people but at a different scale represent an additional, and often
ignored external variable affecting adaptive co-management.
To conclude, Ostrom’s design principles contributed to the identification of opportunities
and barriers to transitioning towards adaptive co-management of small-scale fisheries in
coastal Uruguay and Brazil, where top-down management is still the prevailing approach.
However, there are weaknesses of using Ostrom’s principles for this purpose, such as a lack
of attention to social learning and the exclusion of external drivers. Nevertheless, our re-
search, which represents the first analysis of these two small-scale fisheries from a com-
mons point of view, suggests that Ostrom’s principles can be used as a diagnostic and
prescriptive approach for policy in contexts where governments intend to transition to co-
management, such as in Uruguay, Brazil, and perhaps other countries. Another contribu-
tion of our analysis is that it suggests that participatory processes that bring together differ-
ent stakeholders at multiple levels can help reduce conflicts among them and build nested
governance, increasing compliance with the principles and social-ecological sustainability.
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